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In this paper, I formalize the idea of sustainable development in terms of intergenerational well-
being. I then sketch an argument that has recently been put forward formally to demonstrate
that intergenerational well-being increases over time if and only if a comprehensive measure of
wealth per capita increases. The measure of wealth includes not only manufactured capital, knowl-
edge and human capital (education and health), but also natural capital (e.g. ecosystems). I show
that a country’s comprehensive wealth per capita can decline even while gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita increases and the UN Human Development Index records an improvement.
I then use some rough and ready data from the world’s poorest countries and regions to show that
during the period 1970–2000 wealth per capita declined in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, even
though the Human Development Index (HDI) showed an improvement everywhere and GDP
per capita increased in all places (except in sub-Saharan Africa, where there was a slight decline).
I conclude that, as none of the development indicators currently in use is able to reveal whether
development has been, or is expected to be, sustainable, national statistical ofﬁces and international
organizations should now routinely estimate the (comprehensive) wealth of nations.
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1. QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES
Are humanity’s dealings with nature sustainable? Can
we expect world economic growth to continue in the
foreseeable future? Should we be conﬁdent that knowl-
edge and skills will increase in such ways as to lessen
our reliance on nature in relation to humanity’s
growing numbers and rising economic activity?
Contemporarydiscussionsonthesequestionsarenow
several decades old. If they have remained alive and con-
tinue to be shrill, it is because two opposing empirical
perspectives shape them. On the one hand, if we look
at speciﬁc examples of what economists call natural
capital (aquifers, ocean ﬁsheries, tropical forests, estu-
aries, the atmosphere as a carbon sink—ecosystems,
generally), there is convincing evidence that at the rates
at which we currently exploit them they are very likely
to change character dramatically for the worse, with
little advance notice. Indeed, many ecosystems have
already collapsed, with short notice (M.E.A. 2003;
Hassan et al. 2005). On the other hand, if we study his-
torical trends in the prices of marketed resources (e.g.
minerals and ores), or improvements in life expectancy,
or growth in recorded incomes in regions that are
currently rich and in those that are on the way to becom-
ing rich, resource scarcities would not appear to have
bitten. Suppose you were to point to the troubled
nations of sub-Saharan Africa and suggest that resource
scarcities are acute there today. Those with the former
perspective (ecologists generally) will tell you that it is
because people in the world’s poorest regions face acute
resource scarcities relative to their numbers that they
are sopoor,while thosewiththe latterperspective(econ-
omists usually) will inform you that people there
experience serious resource scarcities because they are
poor. When experts disagree over such a fundamental
matterasthedirectionofcausation,thereislittletogoon.
Those conﬂicting intuitions are also not unrelated
to an intellectual tension between the concerns
people share about carbon emissions and acid rains
that sweep across regions, nations and continents
and about declines in the availability of ﬁrewood,
fresh water, coastal resources and forest products in
as small a locality as a village in a poor country. That
is why ‘environmental problems’ present themselves
in different ways to different people. Some identify
environmental problems with population growth,
while others identify them with wrong sorts of
economic growth. There are those who identify
environmental problems with urban pollution in emer-
ging economies, while others view them through the
spectacle of poverty. Each of those visions is correct.
There is not just one environmental problem. There
is a large collection of them, and they manifest them-
selves at different spatial scales and operate at
different speeds (Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1981, 1990;
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environmental pollutants are the reverse of natural
resources. Roughly speaking, ‘resources’ are ‘goods’
(many being sinks into which pollutants are dis-
charged); while ‘pollutants’ (the degrader of
resources) are ‘bads’. Pollution is the other side of con-
servation. That is why pollution and conservation can
be studied in a uniﬁed way (Dasgupta 1982).
Despite the conﬂicting intuitions, most economists
wouldappear tobeconvincedthatscientiﬁcandtechno-
logical advances, the accumulation of reproducible
capital (machinery, equipments, buildings and roads),
growth in human capital (health, education and skills)
and improvements in the economy’s institutions (which
are also capital assets) can overcome diminutions in
naturalcapital.Otherwise,itishardtoexplainwhytwen-
tieth-century economics has been so detached from the
environmental sciences. Judging by the profession’s
writings, we economists see nature, when we see it at
all, as a backdrop from which resources and services
can be drawn in isolation. Macroeconomic forecasts
routinely exclude natural capital. Accounting for
nature, if it comes into the calculus at all, is usually an
afterthought to the real business of ‘doing economics’.
Weeconomistshavebeensosuccessfulinthisenterprise,
that if someone exclaims, ‘Economic growth!’, no one
needs to ask, ‘Growth in what?’—we all know they
mean growth in gross domestic product (GDP).
The rogue word in GDP is ‘gross’. Since GDP is
the total value of the ﬁnal goods and services an econ-
omy produces, it does not deduct the depreciation of
capital that accompanies production—in particular, it
does not deduct the depreciation of natural capital.
In the quantitative models that appear in leading econ-
omics journals and textbooks, nature is taken to be a
ﬁxed, indestructible factor of production. The pro-
blem with the assumption is that it is wrong: nature
consists of degradable resources. Agricultural land,
forests, watersheds, ﬁsheries, fresh water sources,
river estuaries and the atmosphere are capital assets
that are self-regenerative, but suffer from depletion
or deterioration when they are over-used. (I am
excluding oil and natural gas, which are at the limiting
end of self-regenerative resources.) To assume away
the physical depreciation of capital assets is to draw a
wrong picture of future production and consumption
possibilities that are open to a society.
Hereisanillustrationofwhatgoeswrongineconomic
accounts when depreciation is ignored. Repetto et al.
(1989) and Vincent et al.( 1 9 9 7 )e s t i m a t e dt h ed e c l i n e
in forest cover in Indonesia and Malaysia, respectively.
They found that when depreciation is included, national
accounts look quite different: net domestic saving rates
are some 20–30% lower than recorded saving rates.
In their work on the depreciation of natural resources
in Costa Rica, Solorzano et al.( 1 9 9 1 )found that the
depreciation of three resources (forests, soil and ﬁsh-
eries) amounted to about 10 per cent of GDP and over
one-third of domestic saving.
2. PLAN OF THE PAPER
In this paper, I want to give you a sense of how econ-
omics can be reconstructed to include natural capital
in a seamless way. I shall do that in three stages. In
§3, I show that property rights to natural capital are
frequently unprotected or ill-speciﬁed. I argue that
this typically leads to their overexploitation, and so to
waste and inequity. In §4, I illustrate overexploitation
in the context of a ‘small’ problem: the economic fail-
ure that can accompany deforestation in a small
region. It will not require any stretch of imagination
to recognize that every economy faces innumerable
such ‘small’ problems. The performance of the
macro-economy depends, of course, on how each of
those small problems is tackled there. If good polices
are in place to reduce the economic losses that are gen-
erated by the small problems, the macro-economy can
be expected to function well; but not otherwise. So in
§5, I demonstrate that when natural capital is included
in economic statistics, the recent economic history of
nations looks very different from what we are led to
believe when conventional economic indicators, such
as GDP per head or the United Nations’ Human
Development Index (HDI),
1 are used to judge the
performance of economies.
3. A LACK OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
TO NATURAL CAPITAL
Why do not market prices reﬂect nature’s scarcity
value? If natural capital really is becoming scarcer,
would not their prices have risen, signalling that all is
not well?
The problem is that if prices are to reveal social
scarcities, markets must function well. For many
types of natural capital, though, most especially eco-
logical resources, markets not only do not function
well, often they do not even exist. In some cases,
they do not exist because relevant economic inter-
actions take place over large distances, making the
costs of negotiation too high (e.g. the effects of
upland deforestation on downstream farming and ﬁsh-
ing activities; §4); in other cases, they do not exist
because the interactions are separated by large tem-
poral distances (e.g. the effect of carbon emission on
climate in the distant future, in a world where forward
markets do not exist because future generations are not
present today to negotiate with us). Then there are
cases (the atmosphere, aquifers, the open seas)
where the migratory nature of the resource keeps mar-
kets from existing—they are called ‘open-access
resources’, and they experience the tragedy of the
commons.
Each of the above examples points to a failure to
have secure property rights to natural capital. We can
state the problem thus: ill-speciﬁed or unprotected
property rights prevent markets from forming or
make markets function wrongly when they do form.
By ‘property rights’, I do not only mean private
property rights, I include communal property rights
(e.g. over common property resources, such as wood-
lands, in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa) and state
property rights. At an extreme end are ‘global property
rights’, a concept that is implicit in current discussions
on climate change. But the concept is not new. That
humanity has collective responsibility over the state
of the world’s oceans used to be explicit in the
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‘common heritage of mankind’.
The failure to establish secure property rights to
natural capital typically means that the services natural
capital offers us are underpriced in the market, which
is another way of saying that the use of nature’s ser-
vices is implicitly subsidized. At the global level,
what is the annual subsidy? One calculation suggested
that it is 10 per cent of annual global income (Myers &
Kent 2000). My reading is that the margin of error in
that estimate is very large. But it is the only global esti-
mate I have come across. Hassan et al. (2005) contains
quantitative information that could be used to gener-
ate more reliable estimates of nature’s subsidies.
International organizations such as the World Bank
have the resources to undertake that work. But they
appear to be reluctant to do so.
4. NATURE’S SUBSIDIES
Being underpriced, nature is overexploited. So, an
economy could enjoy growth in real GDP and
improvements in HDI for a long spell even while its
overall productive base shrinks. As proposals for esti-
mating the social scarcity prices of natural resources
remain contentious, economic accountants ignore
them and governments remain wary of doing anything
about them. Here is an example of how the use of
nature is subsidized.
An easy way for governments to earn revenue in
countries that are rich in forests is to issue timber con-
cessions to private ﬁrms. Imagine that concessions are
awarded in the upland forests of a watershed. Forests
stabilize both soil and water ﬂow. So deforestation
gives rise to soil erosion and increases ﬂuctuations in
water supply downstream. If the law recognizes the
rights of those who suffer damage from deforestation,
thetimberﬁrmwouldberequiredtocompensatedown-
stream farmers. But compensation is unlikely when
(i) the cause of damage is many miles away, (ii) the con-
cession has been awarded by the state,
2 and (iii) the
victims are scattered groups of farmers. Problems are
compounded because damages are not uniform across
farms: location matters. It can also be that those who
areharmedbydeforestationdonotknowtheunderlying
cause of their deteriorating circumstances. As the
timber ﬁrm is not required to compensate farmers, its
operating cost is less than the social cost of deforesta-
tion, the latter being the ﬁrm’s logging costs and the
damage suffered by all who are adversely affected. So
if the timber is exported abroad, the export contains
an implicit subsidy, paid for by people downstream.
And I have not included forest inhabitants, who now
live under even more straightened circumstances or,
worse, are evicted without compensation. The subsidy
ishiddenfrompublicscrutiny,butitamountstoatrans-
fer of wealth from the exporting to the importing
country. Some of the poorest people in a poor country
subsidize the incomes of the average importer in what
could well be a rich country. That does not feel right.
(a) Quantifying economic failure
The spatial character of nature’s hidden subsidies is
self-evident, but getting a quantitative feel involves
hard work. So the literature is sparse. As in many
other scientiﬁc ﬁelds, some of the best advances have
been made in studies of localized problems. Basing
their estimate on a formal hydrological model,
Pattanayak & Kramer (2001) reported that the
drought mitigation beneﬁts farmers enjoy from
upstream forests in a group of Indonesian watersheds
are 1–10% of average agricultural incomes. In another
paper, Pattanayak & Butry (2005) studied the extent
to which upstream forests stabilize soil and water ﬂow
in Flores, Indonesia. Downstream beneﬁts were found
to be 2–3% of average agricultural incomes.
In a study in Costa Rica on pollination services,
Ricketts et al. (2004) discovered that forest-based pol-
linators increase the annual yield in nearby coffee
plantations by as much as 20 per cent. Subsequently,
Ricketts et al. (2008) analysed the results of some
two dozen studies, involving 16 crops in ﬁve conti-
nents, and discovered that the density of pollinators
and the rate at which a site is visited by them declines
at rapid exponential rates with the site’s distance from
the pollinators’ habitat. At 0.6 km (respectively,
1.5 km) from the pollinators’ habitat, for example,
the visitation rate (respectively, pollinator density)
drops to 50 per cent of its maximum.
(b) Eliminating nature’s subsidies
How should societies eliminate nature’s subsidies? In
the case of the upstream ﬁrm and downstream farm-
ers, the state could tax the ﬁrm for felling trees. The
ﬁrm in this case would be the ‘polluter’, the farmers
the ‘pollutees’. Pollution taxes are known today as
‘green taxes’. They invoke the polluter-pays-principle
(PPP). The efﬁcient rate of taxation would be the
damage suffered by farmers. What the state does
with the tax revenue is a distributional matter, to
which I shall return presently.
But there is also a ‘market-friendly’ way to eliminate
the subsidies. Lindahl (1958) suggested that the state
(or the community) could introduce private property
rights to natural capital, the thought being that mar-
kets would emerge to price nature’s services
appropriately. A problem with the proposal, at least
as I have presented it here, is that it is not clear who
should be awarded property rights. In our example
of the upstream ﬁrm and downstream farmers, the
sense of natural justice might suggest that the rights
should be assigned to farmers. Under a system of
‘pollutees-rights’, the timber ﬁrm would be required
to compensate farmers for the damage it inﬂicts on
them. Such a property-rights regime also invokes PPP.
But the rights could be awarded to the timber ﬁrm
instead. In that case it would be the farmers who
would have to compensate the ﬁrm for not felling
trees! The latter system of property rights invokes the
pollutee-pays-principle (a reverse PPP, as it were),
which, in the example we are studying, would seem
repellent. But it has been argued by proponents that
from the efﬁciency point of view it is a matter of indif-
ference which system of private property rights is
introduced.
Market-based systems have attracted much atten-
tion among ecologists and development experts in
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vices or PES (see Daily & Ellison (2002) and Pagiola
et al. (2002) for sympathetic reviews of a market-
based PES). The ethics underlying PES are seemingly
attractive. If decision makers in Brazil believe that dec-
imating the Amazon forests is the true path to
economic progress there, should not the rest of the
world pay Brazil not to raze them to the ground? If
the lake on my farm is a sanctuary for migratory
birds, should not bird lovers pay me not to drain it
for conversion into farm land? Never mind that the
market for ecosystem services could be hard to insti-
tute, if a system involving PES were put in place,
owners of ecological capital and beneﬁciaries of eco-
logical services would be forced to negotiate. The
former group would then have an incentive to conserve
their assets.
Hundreds of new PES schemes have been estab-
lished round the globe. China, Costa Rica and
Mexico, for example, have initiated large-scale pro-
grammes in which landowners receive payment for
increasing biodiversity conservation, expanding
carbon sequestration and improving hydrological ser-
vices. But although PES may be good for
conservation, one can imagine situations where the
system would be bad for poverty reduction and distri-
butive justice. Many of the rural poor in poor countries
enjoy nature’s services from assets they do not own.
Even though they may be willing to participate in a
system of property rights in which they are required
to pay for ecological services (Pagiola et al. (2008)
report in their careful study of a silvo-pastoral project
in Nicaragua that they do), it could be that in the
world we have come to know, the weaker among the
farmers are made to pay a disproportionate amount.
Some may even become worse off than they were ear-
lier. One could argue that in those situations the state
should pay the resource owner instead, using funds
obtained from general taxation. Who should pay
depends on the context (Bulte et al. 2008).
A PES system in which the state plays an active role
is attractive for wildlife conservation and habitat pres-
ervation. In poor countries, property rights to
grasslands, tropical forests, coastal wetlands, man-
groves and coral reefs are often ambiguous. The state
may lay claim to the assets (‘public’ property being
the customary euphemism), but if the terrain is difﬁ-
cult to monitor, inhabitants will continue to reside
there and live off its products. Inhabitants are therefore
key stakeholders. Without their engagement, the eco-
systems could not be protected. Meanwhile ﬂocks of
tourists visit the sites on a regular basis. An obvious
thing for the state to do is to tax tourists and use the
revenue to pay local inhabitants for protecting their
site from poaching and free-riding. Local inhabitants
would then have an incentive to develop rules and
regulations to protect the site.
5. MEASURING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Whenever economists have probed the matter, they
have found that all economies subsidize large numbers
of economic transactions with nature. Some of those
transactions are large (construction of large dams
that alter ecosystems), but mostly they are small.
How do those subsidies affect overall economic
performance? More fundamentally, how should
economic performance be measured?
A famous 1987 report by an international commis-
sion (widely known as the Brundtland Commission
Report) deﬁned sustainable development as ‘ ...develop-
ment that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs’ (World Commission for
Environment and Development 1987). In this reckon-
ing, sustainable development requires that relative to
their populations each generation should bequeath
to its successor at least as large a productive base as it
had itself inherited. Notice that the requirement is
derived from a relatively weak notion of justice
among the generations. Sustainable development
demands that, relative to population numbers, future
generations have no less of the means to meet their
needs than we do ourselves; it demands nothing
more. But how is a generation to judge whether it is
leaving behind an adequate productive base for its
successor?
(a) Shadow prices as social scarcities
We noted earlier that neither GDP nor HDI is of help,
because neither is a measure of a country’s productive
base. So, what does measure the productive base? A
society’s productive base is the stock of all its capital
assets, including its institutions. As we are interested
in estimating the change in an economy’s productive
base over a period of time, we need to know how to
combine the changes that take place in its capital
stocks.
Intuitively, it is clear that we have to do more than
just keep a score of capital assets (so many additional
pieces of machinery and equipment, so many more
miles of roads, so many fewer square miles of forest
cover and so forth). An economy’s productive
base declines if the decumulation of assets is not
compensated by the accumulation of other assets.
Contrary-wise, the productive base expands if the decu-
mulation of assets is more than compensated by the
accumulation of other assets. The ability of an asset
to compensate for the decline in some other asset
depends on technological knowledge (e.g. double glaz-
ing can substitute for central heating up to a point, but
only up to a point) and on the quantities of assets the
economy happens to have in stock (e.g. the protection
trees provide against soil erosion depends on the exist-
ing grass cover). The values to be imputed to assets
are known as their shadow prices. Formally, by
an asset’s shadow price, we mean the net increase in
societal well-being that would be enjoyed if an
additional unit of that asset were made available,
other things being equal. As shadow prices reﬂect the
social scarcities of capital assets, it is only in exceptional
circumstances that they equal market prices.
We are trying to make operational sense here of the
concept of sustainable development. So we must
include in the concept of ‘social well-being’ not only
the well-being of those who are alive today, but also
of those who will be here in the future. There are
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centric view of nature, by insisting that certain
aspects of nature have intrinsic value. The concept of
social well-being I am invoking here includes intrinsic
values, if that is demanded. However, an ethical theory
on its own will not be enough to determine shadow
prices, because there would be nothing for the
theory to act upon. We need descriptions of states of
affairs too. To add a unit of a capital asset to an econ-
omy is to perturb that economy. In order to estimate
the contribution of that additional unit to societal
well-being, we need a description of the state of affairs
both before and after the addition has been made, now
and in the future. In short, estimating shadow prices
involves both evaluation and description.
It should not surprise you that estimating shadow
prices is a formidable problem. There are ethical
values we hold that are probably impossible to com-
mensurate when they come up against other values
that we also hold. That does not mean ethical values
do not impose bounds on shadow prices; they do.
That is why the language of shadow prices is essential
if we wish to avoid making sombre pronouncements
about sustainable development that amount to saying
nothing. Most methods that are currently deployed
to estimate the shadow prices of ecosystem services
are crude, but deploying them is a lot better than
doing nothing to value them.
(b) The wealth of nations
The value of an economy’s entire stock of capital assets
measured in terms of their shadow prices is its wealth.
Sometimes, we call it comprehensive wealth, to remind
ourselves that the measure is to include all capital
assets (building and machinery, roads and rail tracks;
health and skills; natural capital and knowledge and
institutions), not just reproducible capital such as
buildings and machinery, roads and rail tracks. Com-
prehensive wealth (henceforth, wealth) is a number;
expressed, say, in international dollars.
It can be shown that an economy’s wealth measures
its overall productive base (Hamilton & Clemens
1999; Dasgupta & Ma ¨ler 2000; Dasgupta 2001). So,
if we wish to determine whether a country’s economic
development has been sustainable over a period of
time, we have to estimate the changes that took place
over that period in its wealth relative to growth in
population. The theoretical result I am alluding to
gives meaning to the title of perhaps the most
famous book ever written on economics, namely, An
inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations.
Observe that Adam Smith did not write about the
GDP of nations, nor of the HDI of nations; he wrote
about the wealth of nations. It would seem we have
come full circle, by identifying sustainable develop-
ment with the accumulation of (comprehensive)
wealth.
(c) An empirical exercise
In an important paper, Hamilton & Clemens (1999)
estimated the change in the wealth of 120 nations
during the period 1970–1996 by deﬁning an econo-
my’s wealth as the value of its reproducible capital
assets and three classes of natural capital assets (com-
mercial forests, oil and minerals and the quality of the
atmosphere in terms of its carbon dioxide content).
The shadow prices of oil and minerals were taken to
be their market prices minus extraction costs. The
shadow price of global carbon emission into the
atmosphere is the damage caused by bringing about
climate change. That damage was taken to be $20
per tonne, which is in all probability a serious under-
estimate. Forests were valued in terms of their
market price minus logging costs. Contributions of
forests to ecosystem functions were ignored.
As you can see, the list of natural resources
Hamilton and Clemens considered was very incom-
plete. It did not include water resources, ﬁsheries, air
and water pollutants, soil and ecosystems. The authors
also ignored improvements in human health and skills,
and they did not consider increases in knowledge, nor
improvements or deteriorations in the countries’ insti-
tutions. Moreover, their estimates of shadow prices
were very, very approximate. Nevertheless, one has
to start somewhere, and theirs was a ﬁrst pass at
what is an enormously messy enterprise.
In table 1, I offer an assessment of the character of
economic development from 1970 to 2000 that is a lot
more comprehensive than the one in Hamilton &
Clemens (1999). I consider only the poorest regions
in the world. I restrict myself to poor countries because
I have studied poor countries more than rich countries.
I consider Bangladesh, China (a poor country during
much of that period), India, Nepal, Pakistan and
sub-Saharan Africa. Economists have discovered inge-
nious ways to estimate the accumulation of knowledge
and changes in the effectiveness of an economy’s insti-
tutions. Those estimates are published regularly by
such international organizations as the World Bank.
The ﬁrst column of ﬁgures in the table presents my
estimates of the average annual percentage rate of
change in wealth in each of the regions in the period
1970–2000. My estimates are a reﬁnement of those
published by Arrow et al. (2004), which in turn were
an improvement on those of Hamilton and Clemens:
I have added to the Hamilton–Clemens estimates for
each region the average annual public expenditure on
health and education, the average annual rate of
growth in knowledge and changes in the effectiveness
of their institutions.
Notice that, excepting sub-Saharan Africa, wealth
increased in every country in my sample. But in jud-
ging whether an economy has experienced
sustainable development during a period, we have to
discover whether wealth has increased relative to popu-
lation growth. The simplest thing to do is to ask
whether wealth per head has increased. In order to esti-
mate movements in wealth per head, I have collated
ﬁgures for the average annual population growth rate
in each region during the period 1970–2000. They
are given in the second column of ﬁgures in the
table. And in the third column, I present the difference
between the ﬁgures in the ﬁrst and second columns,
which gives us estimates of the change in wealth per
head in each of the regions.
Before summarizing the ﬁndings, it will be useful
to get a feel for what the table is telling us. Consider
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sive), wealth increased at an average annual rate of
1.3 per cent. But take a look at Pakistan’s population,
which grew at 2.7 per cent annually. The third column
shows that Pakistan’s per capita wealth declined in con-
sequence, at an annual rate of 1.4 per cent, implying
that in year 2000 the average Pakistani was a lot
poorer than in 1970. Interestingly, if we were to
judge Pakistan’s economic performance in terms of
growth in GDP per capita, we would obtain a different
picture. As the fourth column of the table shows,
Pakistan grew at a respectable 2.2 per cent a year. If
we now look at the ﬁfth column, we ﬁnd that the
United Nations’ HDI for Pakistan improved during
the period. From 1970 to 2000, Pakistan enjoyed
growth in GDP per capita and an improvement in
HDI by running down its natural capital assets. Move-
ments in GDP per capita and HDI tell us nothing
about sustainable development.
The striking message of the table is that during the
period 1970–2000 economic development in all the
countries on our list other than China was ‘negative’.
To be sure, sub-Saharan Africa offers no surprise.
Wealth, not just wealth per head, declined at an
annual rate of 0.1 per cent. Population grew at 2.7
per cent a year. Even without performing any calcu-
lation, we would have known that the productive
base in sub-Saharan Africa declined relative to its
population. The table conﬁrms that it did, at 2.8 per
cent each year. If we now look at the fourth column
of numbers in the table, we discover that GDP per
capita in sub-Saharan Africa declined at 0.1 per cent
annually. But the region’s HDI showed an improve-
ment—conﬁrming once again that studying
movements in HDI enables us to say nothing about
sustainable development.
The table shows that Pakistan is the worst perfor-
mer in the Indian subcontinent. But the remaining
countries in South Asia also did not make it. Admit-
tedly, each country became wealthier, but population
growth was sufﬁciently high to more than neutralize
the growth in wealth. Relative to their populations, the
productive base in each economy declined. Economic
development in South Asia was not sustained.
China was the single exception in my sample. The
country invested so much in reproducible capital
assets that its wealth grew at an annual rate of
5.9 per cent. Population grew at a relatively low rate:
1.4 per cent per year, which is why China’s wealth
per capita expanded at an annual rate of 4.5 per cent.
Per capita GDP also grew, at an annual rate of 7.8
per cent and HDI improved. In China, GDP per
capita, HDI and wealth per head moved parallel to
one another.
The ﬁgures we have just studied are all very rough
and ready, but they show how accounting for natural
capital can make a substantial difference to our con-
ception of the development process. We should
remember that the ﬁgures for several shadow prices
I used to arrive at the table are conservative. For
example, a price of $20 per tonne of carbon in the
atmosphere is almost certainly a good deal below its
true global social cost. And the methods I have used
to value improvements in health and education are
almost certainly defective, but in the opposite direc-
tion: I have underestimated them. So one of the
most important problems we economists face today
is to ﬁnd more effective ways to quantify the progress
and regress of nations. So long as we rely on GDP
and HDI and the many other ad hoc measures
of human well-being, we will continue to paint a
misleading picture of economic performance.
Because of their imperfections, the ﬁgures in the
third column of the table are not be taken literally.
Nevertheless, with all the above caveats (and more!)
in mind, the overarching moral that emerges from it
is salutary:
Development policies that ignore our reliance on natu-
ral capital are seriously harmful—they do not pass the
mildest test for equity among contemporaries, nor
among people separated by time and uncertain
contingencies.
ENDNOTES
1HDI is a composite measure of GDP per head, life expectancy at
birth and education.
2Colchester (1995) has recounted that political representatives of
forest dwellers in Sarawak, Malaysia, have routinely given logging
licenses to members of the state legislature.
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